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Introduction
As well as their representative and legislative functions, a core function of parliaments as
rule-making organisations is ensuring that the executive acts in a manner consistent with
its wishes. To this end, legislators face considerable challenges in attempting to ensure
that the rules they have decided upon on are faithfully implemented by public
organizations over which they exert little direct control. In this chapter, the challenge of
conducting parliamentary scrutiny is addressed. The focus of the analysis is on the
administrative apparatus of central government and, specifically, the ministerial
departments and those public organisations or agencies under their aegis. Also, while
Manning identifies the role of the Seanad in relation to scrutinising the work of the
executive, the chapter is principally concerned with the scrutiny role played by Dáil
Éireann.
Why parliamentary scrutiny?
Put simply, parliamentary scrutiny involves the critical analysis of the outputs and
outcomes of government work. The organisation, comprehensiveness, speed and quality
of the scrutiny process in different parliamentary regimes will vary considerably in line
with the legislature’s institutional design (Norton 1990; Döring 1995) and nature of
political engagement (Ljphart 1999). Within the Westminster tradition, the concept has
its origins in the great struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth century British
parliament as it sought to curb the power and prerogative of the monarch and to punish
royal officials who abused the tax collection system. As executives gained power and
influence, scrutiny by the legislature emerged to become a defining characteristic of
parliamentary government. So important did it become that by the mid-nineteenth
century, in his seminal work on representative government, John Stuart Mill was inclined
to propose that parliaments should delegate much of their work to governments and
suggested that ‘instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the
proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government’ (Mill
1984: 258). Mill’s suggestion retains considerable merit, and ensuring parliaments and
parliamentarians are adequately resourced to oversee and pass judgement on large2
bureaucracies is regularly identified as the premise for parliamentary reform. Others
argue that parliaments are not designed to have proactive scrutiny roles in relation to the
whole bureaucracy; rather the role takes form when failures are identified by other
scrutiny mechanisms, such as audits by the Comptroller and Auditor-General (Flinders
2008: 188).
Before proceeding, it is necessary to distinguish parliamentary scrutiny from the closely
related concepts of parliamentary accountability and parliamentary oversight. In relation
to the former, the development of parliamentary accountability in the Oireachtas and
consequences of its ineffective application have been considered elsewhere
(MacCarthaigh 2005). Scrutiny and accountability are closely related. Scrutiny of
government is an important part of the process of holding government to account. As
Giddings and Irwin propose in distinguishing between the two concepts, scrutiny is to
review, not control; to comment, not countermand; and to invite to reflect, not command
(2005: 67). Unlike accountability, scrutiny is not concerned with the imposition of
sanctions as a response to deviation by an agent from the wishes of its principal – rather it
is concerned with discovering and shedding light on the actions of the agent. In a
parliamentary context, this means legislators individually and collectively examining the
many strands of government activity or inactivity. Thus ‘the object of scrutiny is to
require explanation, to expose that explanation to cross-examination and, by virtue of that
process to achieve a beneficial consequence in terms of the quality of government and
administration’ (Giddings and Irwin 2005: 69).
A common characteristic of public service reforms within the OECD over the last two to
three decades has been the devolution of managerial responsibility from politicians to
administrators (including agencies). While ministers retain ultimately responsibility to
parliament, many duties such as personnel, procurement and in some cases budgetary
controls have been assumed by senior administrators. It is therefore increasingly
necessary to make a distinction between political responsibility and administrative
accountability (Christensen et al 2002: 57). The former implies that those to whom
authority is delegated should be made answer to parliament and engage in debate about3
what course of action should be taken. Thus it makes the government systematically
responsive to public opinion as expressed through parliament. The latter is a more
neutral and technical exercise, in which the use of resources and the quality of services is
examined and set against predetermined objectives. While the complexity of modern
government and administration makes such distinctions attractive, they are inextricably
bound. As all administrative activity involves to some degree the allocation of values, it
is inherently political and thus subject to scrutiny in a political forum such as a
parliament. The accountability of individual administrators for their work is increasingly
a feature of the parliamentary scrutiny process.
Turning to the latter concept of parliamentary oversight, though the two are often
interchanged, it is interpreted here as an ex ante or ‘before the event’ activity, while
scrutiny is normally an ex post or ‘after the event’ concern. One important deviation
from this interpretation is in relation to the development of legislation. The involvement
of non-government members in the process of debating the contents of proposed
legislation is regularly referred to as ‘legislative scrutiny’ and is in effect an ex ante
process. The legislative scrutiny process can continue once law is formally passed,
however, as the implementation of its provisions must be checked.
Why is parliamentary scrutiny important?
Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003) conceptualise parliamentary democracy as a chain of
delegation and accountability between principals and agents of various types i.e. voters
and elected representatives, legislators and ministers, and ministers and civil servants. In
this model, every link in the chain of delegation runs the risk of the agent not performing
to the expectations of the principal (due to, for example, conflicts of interest). In such
circumstances, various ex-ante and ex-post accountability mechanisms are necessary to
ensure compliance. Parliamentary scrutiny of the executive is one of the most important
of these mechanisms.
Parliamentary scrutiny therefore forms part of the accountability chain that stretches from
street-level bureaucrats to the citizen, via central government. In this respect it is a core4
part of representative democracy insofar as it contributes to public trust in the institutions
of government. Failures of parliamentary scrutiny can have serious political and
financial consequences, and undermine public confidence in the political system.
Another central reason for parliamentary scrutiny is that being subjected to it provides
considerable legitimacy for the activities of a public (or non-public) organisation,
assuming that such scrutiny does not uncover serious malpractice.
The growth of the modern Irish state bureaucracy coupled with greater demands for
‘oversight, transparency and accountability’ has determined that the Oireachtas now
engages in more scrutiny work than ever before, and over a greater range of issues and
number of organisations. A major source of difficulty for parliament, however, lies in
managing to keep pace with the complex manner in which public money is allocated,
spent and accounted for. In theory, expenditure follows policy and administration. As
policy making and administration become more complex and technical, the oversight and
scrutiny of public funds becomes a considerable task and legislators are regularly
challenged in trying to comprehend how the executive apparatus of state is working and
allocating resources.
Scrutiny of legislation, financial estimates, reports and government proposals consumes a
considerable portion of parliamentary time. Parliamentary scrutiny of the executive
necessitates considerable information transfer and requires mechanisms for filtering and
managing the information provided, as well as means of cross-examination and
verification. Information is supplied actively, through the government informing the
parliament of events and decisions, or passively through the release of information in
response to questions from parliamentarians. At its most basic level, the effectiveness of
the scrutiny function and the organisational arrangements that facilitate its practice play a
considerable role in determining the public perception of parliament and the role of
parliamentarians, and is therefore worthy of ongoing examination.5
What influences parliamentary scrutiny?
As the earlier chapter by MacCarthaigh identifies, the relationship between legislative
and executive powers will vary according to their constitutional arrangements, procedural
norms and politico-administrative cultures. It stands to reason that the process of
parliamentary scrutiny, which forms a core part of the relationship between the two
pillars of state, will therefore also vary according to these factors. In particular, the use
of formal opportunities provided to members in plenary and committee sessions to
interrogate those responsible directly or indirectly about the various tasks of the public
service can play an important role in determining the activities of public organisations.
In other words, knowing that their actions can be publicly scrutinised by parliament acts
as a strong, but not complete, deterrent to malpractice and maladministration within
public bodies.
Crucially, the effectiveness of scrutiny mechanisms is also dependent on the political
environment in which they are utilised. For example, multiparty coalition governments
increase the complexity of control systems both within the parliament and within the
executive. The size of the polity and consequently the number of institutional actors
within the governing system and at each stage of the delegation chain from citizen to
bureaucrat will play a role. So too will overlapping memberships across different stages
of that chain e.g. between executive and the legislature (Dumont and Varone 2006).
Electoral systems that provide for strong personal votes will also reduce agency loss
between voters and their elected representatives. In fact, in smaller democracies
governments (and particularly coalition governments) may be more attuned to electoral
concerns than in larger systems, resulting in such governments bypassing parliaments in
order to respond directly to public demands. Citizens may also bypass parliament and
government in their scrutiny of the administrative system, through such instruments as
access to information laws and ombudsman offices.
Parliamentary mechanisms alone are arguably not sufficient for the consistent and
comprehensive scrutiny of an increasingly complex and large bureaucracy, and there is
considerable reliance on extra-parliamentary forms of bureaucratic accountability. This6
was recognised in a report by government produced in response to the OECD review of
the Irish public service in 2008, and which noted that:
The invigilation role of the Oireachtas is supported by the work of:
- The Comptroller and Auditor General;
- The Office of the Ombudsman;
- The Office of the Information Commissioner;
- The Commission for Public Service Appointments;
- The Standards in Public Office Commission; and
- The sectoral committees which oversee the performance of policy and
administration across the system.’
(Department of the Taoiseach 2008: 43)
This fragmentation of accountability across different oversight and scrutiny institutions
has uncertain consequences however (MacCarthaigh and Scott 2009: 16-7, OECD 2008:
264). In practice, considerable emphasis is placed on the scrutiny role of Oireachtas
committees, a matter returned to below. Also, while the focus here is on parliamentary
mechanisms and procedures, some of the extra-parliamentary mechanisms noted above
are also utilised by parliamentarians as a means of circumventing traditional
parliamentary means of scrutiny. Chief amongst these are the provisions of the Freedom
of Information Acts 1997 and 2003 which allow members of parliament to access
information on the activities of government departments and many (but not all) public
organisations. Freedom of Information requests can be made on behalf of constituents or
also a means to elicit information which can be used to challenge government policy and
resource allocations. While no analysis of the extent of this work has been published,
anecdotal evidence as well as several public incidents in recent years arising from FOI
requests suggest it is used extensively by some members from both Houses.
How is parliamentary scrutiny pursued in the Oireachtas?
As has been well established in earlier chapters, the Irish system of parliamentary
government has its genetic identity in the Westminster tradition, and in particular, the7
‘efficient’ Cabinet form of government as described by Bagehot (1867/1963: 14). The
reality of parliamentary government as party government means that governments need
only concern themselves with maintaining the support of their backbenchers (and hence a
majority of the chamber) rather than the whole House to ensure their survival. This in
turn determines that opposition parties adopt the role of the electorate’s check over
government, using whatever means they can to scrutinise its work.
A defining feature of the Westminster system on which Irish parliamentary politics is
based is the use of elaborate conventions in the conduct of parliamentary business
(Gamble 1990: 407). In the Dáil, the principal such conventions are codified in the
Standing Orders (see Caffrey, this volume), which play a considerable role in
determining the capacity of opposition members to scrutinise government. For the
purposes of executive scrutiny, the most important of these rules are those relating to
debates and motions, parliamentary questions and the operation of the committee system.
To whom are these scrutiny mechanisms normally applied by parliamentarians? For the
purposes of a more comprehensive understanding of the process of executive scrutiny, a
distinction must be made here between the central government departments under the
immediate control of Minsters (and collectively the Cabinet) and those public
organisations or ‘agencies’ which have a variety of ‘arms length’ relationships to those
departments.
Ministerial departments are the principal organisational units through which the
administrative system operates. While there is a constitutional limit of fifteen applied to
the number of Ministers (including the Taoiseach) in government, there is no limit on the
number of departments over which a Minister can exercise responsibility. For example,
the Fianna Fáil minority government of 1987-9 employed seventeen departments with
both the Taoiseach and one Minster presiding over two departments each. Alongside the
departments, a number of core civil service ‘offices’ exist, including the Office of the
Revenue Commissioners, the Office of the Attorney-General and the Office of Public
Works. Within the machinery of government, these offices are distinguished from the
departments in not having a Minister directly at their head, but they are recognised as8
central institutions at the heart of government. A small number of other organisations,
such as the Comptroller and Auditor General and various Ombudsman offices are
accountable directly to the legislature.
Supplementing the work of Ministries in Ireland are a wide variety of public sector
bodies or agencies
1. Agencies have always formed an integral part of the executive
apparatus of the Irish state
2 but in recent years their number has expanded, due in large
part to changes and reforms in the public service and its relationship to its political
masters. While this is consistent with an international tend (Pollitt et al. 2004), the Irish
experience of ‘agencification’ has been particularly pronounced. The advantage of
agencification is that by putting a greater distance between agencies and the political
leadership of Ministers, it provides these agencies with the necessary insulation and
discretion for the performance of their technical tasks. From a democratic perspective,
the criticism of this distance from political scrutiny is obvious, and the belief that
Ministers will act as strategic goal providers for agencies is rarely borne out in reality.
In the absence of a standard legal, functional or administrative framework for the
classification of different forms of public organisation, as well as the ad-hoc nature of
their creation, however, categorizing Irish agencies is inherently problematic (Hardiman
and Scott 2009). Most (but not all) public organisations in Ireland are created by
government on a statutory basis and provided with various degrees of public authority,
ranging from those which are explicitly independent of Ministerial influence to those
which operate with some autonomy inside a departmental structure. The legal form of
the state’s ownership can, however, vary quite considerably and ranges from those
agencies created on a statutory basis (with or without corporate form), to those
incorporated under company legislation. These are also differences in the the type of
legislation used to create agencies, including primary or secondary legislation, or
administrative circular. Personnel arrangements also differ with agencies staffed by
either civil servants, public servants, or both. Even a simple commercial or non-
1 See also MacCarthaigh 2008: 86-97
2 For more on agencies and Irish agencies in comparative perspective see Verhoest et al. 20109
commercial binary is inadequate given the reality of public service obligations for
commercial state-owned enterprises and the considerable self-financing activities
undertaken by many non-commercial bodies.
Equally, understanding the myriad of accountability relationships between public
organisations and their parent departments is problematic given the variety of reporting,
communication and formal and informal contacts that exist (McGauran et al.: 67-123;
OECD 2008: 171-4). While parliamentary scrutiny of public organisations has always
been an issue identified as being in need of reform by opposition parliamentarians, the
rapid acceleration in the number of public organisations created over the last two decades
(as Table 1 demonstrates) has made the issue even more pronounced. While numbers are
disputed, taking a broad and inclusive interpretation of what constitutes a public service
‘agency’
3 (but excluding such bodies such as public hospitals and schools), a detailed
research project on this matter (Hardiman et al 2009) has identified approximately 340
public organisations in existence as of mid-2009. Many of these are companies and as
such are subject to the legal provisions of the Companies Acts. For all public
organisations, the Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies, revised and
republished in 2009 by the Department of Finance, applies. Indeed, many public bodies
are now subjected to more accountability requirement than their parent Departments,
which undermines somewhat the rationale of delegation to agencies for the purposes of
efficiency
3 For more on this see Hardiman, N. and Scott, C. 2008.10
Table 1: Rate of agency creation in Ireland over the last century
































No of new agencies
With one important exception, (the role of accounting officer- below) the Oireachtas has
no direct constitutional linkage to the civil or wider public service. Instead, the
accountability of the public service is channelled through Ministers who are ‘responsible’
for their departments and the agencies under the aegis of those departments. In relation
to agencies, Ministers have a number of means for influencing the work of agencies. For
those agencies with Boards, Ministers can appoint a certain number of persons of their
choosing (including in some cases civil servants) who will represent their views. The
Minister’s views may also be communicated to the management of an agency through the
senior management of his or her department. Where legislation exists for establishing an
agency, it is also common for the Minister to be provided with a power to issue policy
directions to that agency. Ministers also approve agency budgetary allocations. Figure 1
below identifies a number of typical interdependencies in the relationship between the
Oireachtas, Ministers and agencies under the remit of departments.11







The key foundation on which parliamentary accountability is built is ministerial
responsibility. This doctrine determines that all the activities of government departments
are conducted in the name of their respective ministers, who are the legal embodiment of
their departments. Though subject to consistent criticism and frequently identified as
being outmoded and ineffective given the nature of modern government and politics and
the role of senior civil servants in policy, it remains the central accountability link













O’Malley and Martin (2009: 302-3) identify usefully three principles to the political
dimension of ministerial responsibility - confidence, unanimity and confidentiality. The
confidence principles provides that ministers must maintain the confidence of the Dáil. It
thus follows that the government is ‘collectively responsible’ for the work of the public
administration to parliament. In other words not only does the doctrine ensure a form of
‘vertical’ hierarchical coordination, so too does it provide for collective ‘horizontal’
coordination of policy. Finally, unanimity ensures that all Ministers support decisions
taken at Cabinet, regardless of whether they hold personal opposition to such decisions.
Confidentiality is closely related to unanimity and ensures that ‘what happens at Cabinet
stays at Cabinet’.
The doctrine also has a significant administrative dimension as not only does it provide a
focus for scrutiny of the executive by the Dáil, it also underpins the power of Ministers
over their departments. Commenting on this, Sutherlands notes that,
Having to account in Parliament strengthens his [a minister’s] control
over the department, since the issues that arise in Parliament focus his
attention on specific topics inside his department. Politics, like lightning
can strike anywhere, and thus in a random manner the spotlight of
Parliamentary concern can alert the minister to where he should be
directing his gaze within the department. It keeps not only him but also
his civil servants on their toes (1991: 118)
Thus, in theory at least, ministerial responsibility determines that the minister is
politically responsible to the chamber for all that occurs within his or her department and
related agencies. Until recently, it meant that apart from the Committee on Public
Accounts, the legislature only heard from the Minister in relation to administrative
matters within their department. This has proved problematic as increased
responsibilities have been devolved to senior civil servants and the heads of public sector
organisations. As a result, a recent development has been the use of sectoral committees
to allow parliamentarians to engage directly with the public service (below). In theory,13
policy matters remain the responsibility of the Minister but in practice the policy-
administration dichotomy is difficult to determine in many instances (and particularly in
relation to EU matters).
In practice, ministerial (and collective) responsibility can be both contingent and
relational. In other words, ministerial or government resignations based on ministerial or
collective responsibility are often determined by the standing of the minister in question
and the judgement of the prime minister (Rhodes 2006: 331). In this respect, forces
external to parliament (and particularly the media) play an important role and ministerial
resignations can result more commonly for personal improprieties than for actual
portfolio mismanagement or maladministration.
In more recent years, Ministers of State have adopted more prominent roles in
representing parts of the public service to the Oireachtas. A particular innovation has
been the Office of the Minister for Children which represents an amalgam of sections
from three government departments and under the political control of a Minister of State.
As the organisational complexity of the state has intensified, however, the distinction
between matters of policy and of administration and the location of responsibility for
each has become even harder to discern. This in turn has resulted to regular opposition
party claims that they cannot access the information they seek or that Ministers are using
agencies as a means of avoiding answering questions on policy. Before considering these
issues in more detail, it is necessary to identify the methods employed to scrutinise
departments and agencies in the Oireachtas.
Debates, motions on policy and reports
As identified by MacCarthaigh and Caffrey (this volume), parliament spends
considerable time deliberating on matters of public policy which inevitably involve
judgements on the role and efficacy of public organisations involved in different policy
fields such as health, education or the environment. Members of the opposition may also
seek to table a motion concerning a particular agency or group of agencies. The Houses
of the Oireachtas and its committees and members are also presented with a wide range14
of reports, and in many cases these reports (and accounts – below) form the principal
vehicles of parliamentary scrutiny. Traditionally these included annual or special reports
(some of which had been commissioned by the committees themselves) but public
service reforms have resulted in a number of new documents. These include value-for-
money reviews by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, output statements which detail
the results achieved by public bodies in the previous year and their relationship to that
body’s strategy; and the reports of the organisational review programme. This latter
report was initiated in three government departments in 2008 and sought to evaluate the
capacity of the departments to perform their work. It is intended that the programme be
extended to all departments and public bodies. In the main these reports are referred to
the various sectoral committees (below). Another recent initiative is the proposed
production by regulatory bodies of annual ‘public interest statements’, alongside annual
reports (Department of the Taoiseach 2009: 5).
Budgets, Estimates and Accounts
Apart from day-to-day debates and motions, the annual budgetary process and the
provision of estimates for public expenditure by Ministers also offer opportunities for
members of the opposition to critically analyse the government’s management of the
bureaucracy (Hamell, this volume). Government expenditure is divided into a 15 ‘vote
groups’ – one per department – which in most (but not all) cases also delineate the
allocations to agencies within each department. The vast majority of state agencies and
enterprises are also required to present their annual accounts to the Houses, as well as the
responsible Minister.
Financial scrutiny: The Accounting Officer role
Within the hierarchy of the civil service grading structure, the most senior position is that
of Secretary-General. As well as their administrative roles, incumbents are also
‘Accounting Officers’ in respect of the management of financial affairs within their
departments. This dual role, which predates the state
4, emerged as holders of this
4 The Accounting Officer role was provided for in the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 186615
position ‘alone had sufficient authority within the Department to discharge the
responsibilities attaching to the role’ (Department of Finance 2002: Section 18).
In their capacity as Accounting Officers, each Secretary-General must appear before the
Committee of Public Accounts (a committee with particular political gravitas and
commonly known as the Public Accounts Committee of PAC) on an annual basis to
provide evidence and answer questions on their department’s budgetary performance and
their personal stewardship of public funds. In other words, the Minister could not
prevent their appearance before the Committee. This personal aspect of the role is an
important distinction as it is in contrast to the Secretary General’s other functions which
are carried out in the name of the Minister. The role of Accounting Officer has been
extended beyond Secretaries-General and a number of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
of state agencies also have this personal duty e.g. the CEO of the Health Service
Executive. Adding to the inconsistency pertaining to the accountability arrangements for
state agency arrangments, however, many agency CEOS are not accounting officers,
considering themselves instead to be accountable officers but not holding personal
liability.
As the oldest committee of the Dáil, the Committee of Public Accounts is in effect
delegated the task of financial scrutiny of the bureaucracy on behalf of the Oireachtas and
it is to this committee that accounting officers normally present evidence and defend their
actions. In this role, the Committee draws on the support of the constitutional office of
the Comptroller and Auditor-General. While the Comptroller and Auditor-General’s
office performs a vital role, a peer review of the office of the C&AG published in 2008
found that within the public service, the Office’s annual audit was ‘regarded more as a
‘necessary evil’, than as a process which can add value to the client’ (2008: 4). It also
reported that the Office was performing its role in the accountability of the Executive to
Dáil Éirann [sic] as well as it might – partly because of its own practices, but primarily
because of limitations on the mandate of the Auditor General ‘ (2008: 5).16
Amongst these limitations, it included:
- the Auditor General’s lack of autonomy in resourcing the Office, flowing from the
Office’s being part of the civil service;
- his restricted mandate to carry out value for money audits – in particular, the very
limited mandate to examine the effectiveness of public expenditure;
- the limited extent to which, and process by which, the Auditor General can report on the
financial and value for money audits of entities other than departments;
- the absence of a follow-up mechanism for audit findings; and
- the the limited extent to which the Auditor General can ‘follow’ public money into the
hands of a recipient who is a non-government organisation.
The report also suggested that the ‘Auditor General’s support of the accountability of the
Executive to Dáil Éirann [sic] could be enhanced if he were to audit output statements
delivered by departments’ (2008: 5)
Parliamentary Questions
As the chapter by Caffrey (this volume) identifies, there are a variety of types of
parliamentary question. Due to the convention of ministerial responsibility, the vast
majority of questions are normally put by members of the opposition to the Minister. As
Gallagher (2009: 217-8) and MacCarthaigh (2005: 119-22) identify, however, there have
been several high profile incidents whereby the responses to questions were deemed
inadequate or even misleading.
The state of affairs in relation to parliamentary questions pertaining to public
organisations is increasingly problematic. With the rapid growth in the number of
agencies employed by government, not alone has the issue of the capacity of the
Oireachtas to scrutinise their work arisen, but so too has the ability of the Oireachtas to
question Ministers about agencies. For their part Ministers will claim that they are not
responsible for the day-to-day operations of agencies while opposition members point to
Ministers using this explanation as a means of avoiding answering potentially
uncomfortable questions and point out that they have no means of putting questions to17
agencies. In fact, it is not in the interest of agencies to avoid providing responses to
questions and in practice, though not formally required of them, many do so.
As areas of high public visibility political sensitivity, the performance of public health
and social services organisations have always attracted large numbers of parliamentary
questions. In 2005, a new and very large agency was created - the Health Services
Executive (HSE) – into which almost all pre-existing health and social service provision
organisations were merged. The HSE was given responsibility for the management and
administration of health and social services with responsibility for policy remaining with
the Department of Health and Children. Significantly, a Parliamentary Affairs Division
was created within the new agency but the relationship between it and members of the
Oireachtas has frequently proved contentious. Specifically, concerns expressed by TDs
that PQs submitted to the HSE were taking too long to be replied to resulted in the
adoption by the HSE in early 2008 of a policy of no more than fifteen working days for
responses to PQs. The volume of such questions received by the Division from the
Parliamentary Affairs Section of the Department of Health and Children has been
considerable, with over 2700 questions received in 2007 increasing to over 3500 in 2008.
Committees
The Irish committee system has developed only comparatively recently (see Martin, this
volume). It has provided for a sharp increase in the processing of parliamentary business,
including examination of estimates, reports and strategic plans presented by departments
and agencies. It also provides a ‘pressure valve’ by allowing interest and civil society
groups to make their case directly to parliamentarians rather than through the civil
service. Of particular importance to this chapter is the opportunity provided to
parliamentarians in committees to directly question civil servants and the heads of public
organisations about their work.
As with PQs, appearances before committees provide a means for TDs (and Senators) to
elicit information on the work of the bureaucracy and equally to serve as an incentive for
probity and good practice within the public service. Though Ministers may also answer18
questions and discuss matters pertaining to the role in committees, unlike PQs,
committees allow for parliamentarians to interrogate officials directly. Reports on public
service reform (e.g. OECD 2008, Department of the Taoiseach 2008) place considerable
emphasis on this administrative scrutiny role of committees. By way of example, the
report of the recent Task Force on the Public Service recommended that:
All public bodies (Departments and agencies) should be required to
provide an integrated Annual Report covering both input usage
(expenditure) and output delivery with a focus on the achievements of
the organisation. These reports would provide the basis for a
comprehensive Oireachtas scrutiny i.e. moving away from the present
focus on audited reports of input use alone. This will have legislative
and operational implications for Oireachtas Committees, Ministers, and
Accounting Officers, arising from new oversight arrangements for
Departments. (Department of the Taoiseach 2008: 11)
The scrutiny expectations on parliamentary committees in relation to public organisations
are significant, as committees are viewed as providing the central legitimising link
between political authority and administrative action. This has clear resource and
capacity implications, and, notwithstanding the increase in the budgetary allocation of the
Oireachtas and its committees in recent years (see Coughlan, this volume), challenges
remain. For example, a review in 2009 of various regulatory agencies in Ireland found
that ‘the ability of Oireachtas committees effectively to hold regulators to account
[appeared] to be limited because they lack the specialist knowledge to do so’ (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2009: 54).
Governments also influence agencies through the process of Board appointments to state
agencies and commercial state enterprises. Such appointments are normally within the
gift of the relevant Minister but others may require Cabinet (or in particular the
Taoiseach’s) approval, or at a minimum they will be informed of the imminent
appointments. By contrast such appointments do not require the approval of either Dáil
or Seanad. A major departure in the process of Ministerial appointments, however, was
the provision in the Broadcasting Bill 2008 to allow four of nine board members of the
newly proposed Broadcasting Authority of Ireland to be recommended by the Oireachtas19
Joint Committee on Communications, with similar provisions for the Boards of the
commercial state enterprises RTÉ and TG4.
As the expanded committee system becomes embedded within the parliamentary
structure, committee chairs are increasingly sought out for their views on matters relating
to departments covered by their committee’s remit. Also, media coverage of committee
work, though still at a low level, has increased and it is not unusual to see committee
proceedings on the news. However, while the committee system has evolved
considerably, there are limits to its resources and staffing, and political factors such as the
role of the chair and the maintenance of government majorities will limit their capacity to
develop in a manner that could fundamentally undermine executive authority.
Conclusions: Parliament as a scrutiny ‘apex’
Notwithstanding enhanced funding and resourcing for the Oireachtas, growth in the
state’s capacity and the fragmentation of the public service has continued to challenge the
capacity of the Oireachtas to comprehend, yet alone scrutinize, the extension of public
authority within and beyond departments and core government offices and agencies.
While the devolution of state power to agencies and non-public actors (including for
example religious orders in key areas of social provision) is not a new phenomenon in
Irish public life, the scale has altered dramatically in recent years. Rather than being
‘rolled back’ or ‘hollowed out’, the manner in which the state conducts its work has been
transformed. As well as new structures, there are new modes of governance and also new
means of service delivery involving the state and market, including Public-Private
Partnerships and the contracting out of services.
While committees have added an extra dimension to the scrutiny capacity of the
Oireachtas, there remain considerable gaps in the scrutiny process that are further
hindered by the reality of partisan politics and the absence of common scrutiny
objectives. This does not mean that parliamentary scrutiny has failed, and claims that
parliamentary scrutiny of public bodies and agencies is non-existence clearly do not hold
water. The considerable increase in the sitting and volume of evidence presented to20
Oireachtas committees indicates greater engagement by parliamentarians. In 2008, for
example, over 1300 witnesses, many of whom were civil and public servants, provided
evidence to almost 600 Oireachtas committee sittings. Rather, the issues are the extent of
its coverage (given the size of the bureaucracy), incentives for parliamentarians to be
‘scrutinizers’, and the link between scrutiny findings and subsequent action.
As indicated from the outset of this volume, a core function of the Oireachtas is to
provide a central scrutiny function for the work of the executive pillar of state and its
administrative apparatus. While other accountability mechanisms have particular roles to
play, they cannot replace the Oireachtas as the ultimate arbiter on the use of executive
power. In this respect, parliament’s role should be at the apex of an accountability system
that goes beyond scrutiny of the immediate confines of Ministerial departments. In the
words of Uhr (1999: 102; as quoted in Behn 2001: 41),
The central arena of accountability is the political assembly, which
exists to provide the community with a public accounting of public
officials. The political assembly is the filtering institution between
community and government, and public accountability is at base a
filtering exercise in which the assembly ‘audits’ (literally, listens to) the
accounts by responsible ministers and officials of the use of public
offices and funds.
In the search for a more effective culture of scrutiny, it is instructive to reflect on the
deliberations of the European Convention’s Working Group on National Parliaments,
which considered the factors conducive to effective scrutiny of EU affairs within national
parliaments (2002). These included, the timeliness, scope and quality of information
received, the active involvement of sectoral/standing committees in the scrutiny process,
and the availability of supporting staff. While most agencies report to parliament via
their Minister, ongoing engagement between the CEOs of state agencies and Oireachtas
committees is also a central part of administrative scrutiny. Also, greater awareness of
administrative practice, reforms and innovations amongst members of parliament would
contribute significantly to the scrutiny process.21
As the Irish public service embarks on a series of reforms to provide for greater
integration and ‘joined-up’ policy, it will be necessary for parliament to align its scrutiny
function to match the cross-departmental and cross-sectoral nature of public
administration. This will undoubtedly prove problematic for political accountability
given that Ministers are not incentivized to answer to parliament for departments other
than their own. To compensate for this, there will need to be more co-operation between
Oireachtas committees as well as scrutiny of Ministers of State who normally have cross-
departmental or cross-sectoral functions. For all this, the greatest impediment to
comprehensive scrutiny of the executive’s administrative apparatus is political
partisanship. Party loyalty, though providing for cohesion and discipline within the
Oireachtas, is inimical to developing a shared purpose amongst parliamentarians on
scrutiny issues and particularly in respect of matters of potential or actual political
sensitivity.22
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